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Territorialization of State Power through Land Development in Southern China 1 
  
By George C. S. Lin, The University of Hong Kong 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the relationship between urban land development and municipal finance in 
a Chinese regional economy undergoing rapid urbanization. Drawing upon insights from the 
perspective of political economy, this article identifies a strategy by which land-centered 
urbanization has been actively pursued as a means of revenue generation in response to the 
reshuffling of state power. The territorialization of state power is realized through the expansion 
of urban space into the rural vicinity and the conversion of rural land into high-valued urban 
development to a greater regional extent. In contrast to the urbanization of capital observed in the 
global North, where an overaccumulation of capital leads to a sequential switch of the circuits of 
capital, urbanization in China has been pursued as a strategy to mobilize and accumulate original 
capital. Contrary to conventional wisdom, urbanization has not been an outcome responsive to 
economic growth; instead, it has been an active driving force instrumental to regional 
transformation. This article calls for greater attention to be directed to the interrelationship 
between land development, local public finance, and urbanization in the ongoing transformation 
of the Chinese political economy. 
 
Introduction 
Until recently, research on Chinese urbanization focused on the definition of the urban 
population, an accurate estimate of the magnitude of urbanization, and the growth and 
distribution of rural-urban migration (Zhou and Ma 2003; Chan and Hu 2003; Chan 2007; Fan 
2008). Population migration is considered a key measurement of urbanization. As the Chinese 
economy is inherently political, research on the mechanism of urbanization has focused on 
changes in the Chinese political economy (Ma 2002; Lin 2002; McGee et al. 2007; Walker and 
Buck 2007). The imperative of economic growth as one of the driving forces of urban 
development has been highlighted and evaluated (Chan 1992; Pannell 2002; Lin 2002). In recent 
years, new attempts have been made to apply influential Western political economic theories, 
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such as capital switching, urban growth machine, urban regime, and neoliberalism, to China’s 
ongoing urban transformation (Zhu 2002, 2004; Ma and Wu 2005; Wu, Xu, and Yeh 2007; 
McGee et al. 2007; F. Wu 2008). However, relatively little has been done to analyze the role 
played by land development in the process of urbanization, municipal finance, and local capital 
accumulation. 
In contrast to the research on China’s urbanization for which abundant materials are 
available from regular population censuses, studies of China’s land has long suffered from the 
lack of reliable and systematic information. Official statistics regarding China’s cultivated land 
have been found unreliable because they underreported the actual amount by nearly 40 percent 
(Ash and Edmonds 1998; Smil 1999; Lin and Ho 2003). A limited and piecemeal empirical base 
has naturally given rise to a body of literature found to be “fragmented and isolated” (Ho 2005, 
8). On one hand, important effort has been made to examine how China’s rural land has been 
used (Brown, 1995; Ash and Edmonds 1998; Smil 1999; Po 2008; Wang and Scott 2008). 
Researchers are divided, however, between those who see the ambiguous collective ownership of 
rural land as the root cause of its inefficient use and those who stress the social embeddedness of 
property rights assignments (Kung and Liu 1997, Ho 2001, Zhu 2002, Cai 2003, Ho 2005). On 
the other hand, a separate strand of research has been undertaken by planners and geographers to 
examine the commercialization of housing provision in Chinese cities, assess the emergence of 
the urban land market, and evaluate the pattern and processes of urban land development (Wu 
1996; Zhu 2002, 2005; Ho and Lin 2004b; Hsing 2006, 2010; Haila 2007). In the existing 
literature, urban and rural land have often been treated separately. However, given the fact that 
these sectors are interconnected and that much of the land used for urban development has 
actually been expropriated from the rural sector, it would not be possible to fully understand the 
complex processes of land development without a close scrutiny of how land is taken away from 
the rural collective at low cost for high-valued urban development. Moreover, the financial 
motives for urban expansion at the cost of rural land, and the consequences of urban 
development on regional inequality as well as social stability, have remained highly sensitive, 
yet significant topics for serious investigation. 
As an essential part of China’s institutional reforms, the reformulation of central-local 
fiscal relations since the 1980s has attracted great attention from economists and political 
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scientists with special interest in China. The reform of central-local fiscal relations started in the 
early 1980s, when the system of fiscal responsibility (caizheng baoganzhi) was introduced, under 
which provincial governments were allowed to retain surplus revenue after a lump-sum 
remittance (fixed for five years) had been made to the center. Subsequent research has shown 
that fiscal decentralization significantly aroused local developmental enthusiasm, augmented 
local revenue, and weakened the financial capacity of the central state (Wong 1991; Wong, 
Heady, and Woo 1995; Chung 1995). A landmark event occurred in March 1994 when Beijing 
confronted its provinces and introduced a new tax-sharing system, or TSS (fenshuizhi), with 
which localities were requested to pay taxes proportional to local income, instead of a fixed 
lump-sum remittance (Chung 1994; Tsang and Cheng 1994). Recent studies have shown that the 
introduction of TSS fundamentally altered China’s central-local fiscal relations (Wong 1997; 
Zhang 1999; World Bank 2002; Tsui and Wang 2004). It substantially raised the central share in 
revenue and reduced that of local governments. While the importance of fiscal recentralization 
since 1994 has been widely recognized by economists and political scientists, its impact on the 
developmental behavior of local governments remains poorly understood. Geographers and 
planners have been preoccupied with studying the demographic and spatial aspects of 
urbanization and have seldom made reference to the 1994 reformulation of central-local fiscal 
relations. Even the literature on central-local fiscal relations is arguably incomplete. A World 
Bank study (2002) suggested that, subsequent to the 1994 tax-sharing arrangement, subnational 
governments accounted for over 70 percent of total public expenditure while collecting less than 
50 percent of total government revenue. Here, total government revenue is so important to local 
public finance that we cannot afford to overlook it. Without taking into consideration the role 
played by land development in local public finance, any assessment of the new central-local 
fiscal relations must lead to partial and misleading conclusions. 
The issue under investigation here is situated at the interface of the existing lines of 
scholarly inquiry concerning changes in urbanization, land-use development, and central-local 
fiscal relations in post-reform China.  In advanced capitalist economies, it is believed that the 
production of the urban built environment is intrinsically related to the accumulation and 
circulation of capital. What has been the case in a China undergoing market transition? How 
does capital accumulate via land development in a transition economy? What is the relationship 
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between land development and local public finance, and how does this relationship change over 
time and across space? 
I argue that recent developments in the increasingly global and urban Chinese economy 
have brought about a new situation under which urbanization, land-use change, and local public 
finance can no longer be understood separately. The reformulation of the fiscal relationship 
between the central state and local governments, in the 1980s and again in 1994, effectively 
decentralized investment responsibilities and recentralized tax collection power, making it 
necessary for municipal governments to pursue land development as an important means of 
revenue generation to finance urban economic growth and urbanization. Marketization of the 
land disposition system since the late 1980s has ushered in a dual-track land market with 
noticeable asymmetry between different market segments for lucrative arbitrage, making it 
possible for municipal governments to capitalize on land as an asset for continuing economic 
growth and urbanization. Meanwhile, the interests of global capitalism in China as a new outlet 
of accumulation by dispossession have further facilitated China’s urbanization, involving not 
only labor but also land and capital (Harvey 2003; Glassman 2006; Lin 2009a). 
The result has been a shifting emphasis of capital investment from the rural to the urban 
sector, or from the countryside in the 1980s to cities, especially large cities, after the 1990s (Ma 
and Wu 2005; McGee et al. 2007; Lin 2007, 2009b; Hsing 2006, 2010; Huang 2008). An integral 
part of this process of urbanization of capital has been a popular local practice to capitalize on 
the land within the boundary of the urban jurisdiction and its rural vicinity. This capitalization of 
land has been undertaken in at least three important ways. First, the land conveyance fee 
collected by municipal governments has been used to finance the development, improvement, 
and maintenance of the urban built environment so as to attract foreign investment and enlarge 
the tax base (Wu 1999, 2010; Lin 2009b). Second, the urban land owned by the state has been 
leased out by municipal governments in a differentiated manner to different users for different 
purposes. Industrial land is usually leased out at very low cost in order to lure foreign investment. 
Once the inflow of foreign investment has brought about the momentum of growth and increased 
land value, other kinds of land are then leased out for commercial and real estate development at 
high prices to compensate for any loss in early industrial development. A vibrant built 
environment for urban economic growth can then be created to generate sustained tax revenue 
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(Lin 2007, 2009b). Finally, urban land has been used by many investment and development 
corporations set up by municipal governments as collateral to obtain bank loans and mobilize the 
capital needed for the upgrade and expansion of the urban built environment (Xu and Yeh 2005, 
2009; McGee et al. 2007). In accordance with Hsing’s introduction to this special issue, this 
paper argues that the politics of spatial production is to be understood as a process of 
territorialization of the local state, conditioned by its capacity to control land and mobilize 
capital. Territorial expansion and consolidation through land development projects are key to 
local state building. In this process, the expansion and contraction of jurisdictional boundaries to 
force rural-urban integration for the sake of land control are key to the politics of 
territorialization in China today.   
 
Definitional and Methodological Issues 
The central question for theoretical and empirical inquiry in this article essentially 
concerns the way in which a Chinese regional economy is transformed in the current era of 
marketization and globalization. How has the needed capital been mobilized and accumulated? 
What has been the role of land development in the process of original capital accumulation and 
regional transformation? Since the 1990s, many regional economies in China have experienced a 
common process of massive land development and dramatic expansion of city boundaries. Why 
has this been the case? How is this related to dynamics of regional development? What are the 
social and political origins of the latest wave of regional development in China, and what have 
been its social and economic consequences? 
To answer these questions, three propositions are made on the basis of prior knowledge 
and commonsense intuition. First, mobilization of capital through the sale of land is essential to 
the initial development of a regional economy in China, which stands in contrast with the 
dynamics of urbanization of capitals in the West, where an overaccumulation of capital has been 
the norm. Second, the phenomena of city-based and land-centered urban and regional 
transformation, observed since the 1990s, owe their origins to the changing socialist political 
economy, particularly the recent reformulation of the central-local relations that concern capital 
investment and revenue remittance. Finally, a reterritorialization of state power, through which 
land resources have been converted from the rural to the urban sector, tends to favor the growth 
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of the metropolis at the expense of the periphery and therefore contributes to increased regional 
inequality. 
The questions and propositions made above have brought up several research parameters 
that require clarification. In this article, urbanization is seen not simply as a process of 
demographic restructuring, but as a strategy actively pursued by local governments to mobilize 
and accumulate the capital needed for economic growth. By expanding urban land into the rural 
vicinity or converting rural land into urban development, municipal and county governments 
have realized the appreciated land value and generated revenue. In a similar manner, 
territorialization is used to refer to a strategy in which urban space is either expanded into the 
urban fringe or created out of the rural periphery. The territorialization of state power through 
land development is used to denote the extent to which capital mobilization has become 
increasingly dependent on urbanization. 
The empirical case chosen for this study is Guangdong Province, which is located on 
China’s southeastern coast with close proximity to Hong Kong and extensive preexisting social 
connections with overseas Chinese in the Western world. Among China’s thirty-one subnational 
economies (provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities), Guangdong was ranked 
third in terms of total population (including migrants) and fifteenth in land area in 2010. 
However, this southern province was ranked first in gross domestic product (GDP), exports, and 
utilized foreign capital investment. The province has made an outstanding contribution to the 
national economy in exports (31 percent) and attraction of utilized foreign investment (24 
percent), both of which are greater than its share of land (2 percent) and people (7 percent) by a 
large margin. Obviously, Guangdong represents a Chinese regional economy with wide exposure 
to the intrusion of global market forces. It should be acknowledged that this case study of a 
leading regional economy cannot be taken as representative of the entire country. Nevertheless, a 
study of Guangdong can generate significant insights into the nature and dynamics of the 
transformation of a socialist regional economy that has integrated itself with the global orbit of 
accumulation by dispossession. Furthermore, an evaluation of the experiences, both good and 
bad, of a province that has moved “one step ahead” of the country in regional development can 
yield important lessons for other Chinese regions that have yet to negotiate with the forces of 
marketization and globalization. 
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The study period covers the two decades since the 1990s, when the practice of 
territorialization of capital has become pronounced as a consequence of the reshuffling of 
central-local state power relations. Three sets of data are used for analysis. They include changes 
in land use between 1996, when China conducted the first national land census, and 2004, the 
latest year for which land statistics are available. These data provide an important empirical base 
to assess the magnitude and sectorial composition of land-use change, which has been central to 
regional development over the past decade. The second set of data concerns changes in central-
local fiscal relations since the 1990s, particularly the reformulation of capital investment and 
revenue remittance as well as taxation. Special attention is paid to the contribution of income 
from land conveyance to the local extrabudgetary revenue subsequent to the reforms of central-
local fiscal relations. These data are analyzed to shed light on the financial motives for local 
governments to engage in land development. Finally, the growth and spatial redistribution of 
GDP are analyzed to evaluate the outcome of regional development. The tools used for data 
analysis include descriptive statistics, location quotients, and coefficient of variation, which are 
commonly used in the study of regional development. It should be noted that the population data 
used in this study include migrant population, in order to avoid any distorted estimate of 
productivity, such as per capita GDP and its spatial distribution. 
 
Guangdong as Forerunner 
Among Chinese regions, Guangdong Province is the one most illustrative of how a 
regional economy under state socialism could be dramatically transformed by the forces of 
marketization and globalization. In contrast with other Chinese regions, Guangdong is 
characterized by its gateway location, easily accessible to overseas investors; its extensive social 
connections with overseas Chinese; and its position relatively distant from the political center of 
the nation. The existence of Guangdong’s global social connections, coupled with its geographic 
proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan, has allowed the region to enjoy greater opportunity than its 
peers in terms of external capital mobilization, information about the global market, advanced 
technological know-how, and modern managerial skills. 
Guangdong was chosen by the post-Mao regime as a laboratory to test the feasibility of 
developing a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. Since 1979, the province, 
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along with Fujian, has been allowed to implement special policies (teshu zhengce) and move 
“one step ahead” of the country to experience reforms and “opening up” (gaige kaifan). Such a 
special arrangement was made not so much to give Guangdong preferential treatment, but to use 
it as a testing ground for an uncertain idea that carries a risk of failure. To the postreform regime, 
Guangdong was the chosen one because any possible failure of “reforms and opening up” there 
would not have devastating effects on the mainstay of the Chinese economy. Although no 
additional state capital investment has been committed to Guangdong since the reforms, the 
region has indeed been given greater leeway than its peers to practice market forces, attract 
foreign investment, promote exports, and engage with global capitalism. 
 
Land Development in the Pearl River Delta 
The process of land development in Guangdong since the reforms took place initially in 
the towns and villages of the countryside, particularly in the extended metropolitan regions of the 
Pearl River Delta in the 1980s (McGee 1991; Lin 1997, 2001). Politically, the rural areas have 
always had the weakest links with the state in terms of both central supports and control, which 
made it both necessary and possible to pursue locally driven economic growth. The rural areas 
were also the places where economic reforms were initiated earlier and more successfuly than in 
their urban counterparts (Naughton 1995; Lin 1997). Furthermore, foreign investment as one of 
the main sources of capital mobilization was pioneered by investors from Hong Kong in the 
early years of the opening up. Many of the rural townships and villages in the Pearl River Delta 
region were the hometowns of Hong Kong investors and therefore became destinations of 
foreign investment (Vogel 1989; Johnson and Peterson 1999). Finally, land and labor in the 
countryside were easily accessible to both domestic and international developers. As a result, 
regional economic development in Guangdong in the first decade of reforms and opening up was 
characterized by dramatic growth of the rural economy. The magnitude and extent of rural 
industrialization and urbanization of the countryside in Guangdong throughout the 1980s were so 
phenomenal that the leading positions held by large cities, such as Guangzhou, Foshan, Jiangmen, 
and many others, were effectively challenged and undermined.2 The peculiar experience of rural 
industrialization and urbanization in Guangdong has been the subject of extensive documentation 
and various interpretations, ranging from the enthusiastic observation of a surprising “trickle-
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down” effect at such an early stage of economic growth to the proposition of “region-based 
urbanization” as a viable alternative to city-based urbanization (Xu and Li 1990). 
The emergence of many rapidly industrializing and urbanizing economies in the extended 
metropolitan regions of the Pearl River Delta has posed great challenges and competition to 
central cities such as Guangzhou. Decentralization of power and responsibility has compelled 
localities to find their own ways of mobilizing capital for economic development. Marketization 
and the opening up made it possible for localities to race and compete in the new field of locally 
driven economic development. Competition among localities has also been underscored by the 
new political reality, whereby the promotion of local cadres is directly linked with the record of 
local economic growth, so that government leaders of cities, counties, and towns have every 
incentive to speed up local economic growth and beat their rivaling neighbors. Competition 
extends into many sectors of the economy and areas of the province, but two main types of 
competition can be easily identified: competition among localities in the same region and 
competition among localities of the same level in the country. For instance, Guangzhou 
municipality faces strong competition from its neighboring economies, but it also has to compete 
with many central cities of the same rank in the broader national context. In a similar manner, 
Dongguan, a country-level economy and a major recipient of Hong Kong and Taiwanese 
investment, faced competition not only from its neighboring economies in the Pearl River Delta, 
but also from faraway rivals in the lower Yangtze Delta region, such as Suzhou and Kungshan. 
Whether the rivals involved are near or far, they are competing primarily for the attraction of 
external capital, setting up of export processing industries, and ultimately the growth of GDP. 
Competition among localities for capital investment, industrialization, and GDP growth 
has to be materialized and grounded through the development of land, however. In the case of 
Guangdong, and arguably beyond Guangdong as well, land has become instrumental to the 
attraction of foreign capital investment, promotion of exports, and expansion of the local 
economy for a number of reasons. First, foreign investors are usually induced to China through 
the offer of tax concessions and low-cost land. For the localities in Guangdong, offering tax 
concessions provides little leeway to manipulate because central taxes are standardized and local 
taxes take only a small share.3 By comparison, local governments (i.e., municipalities and county 
governments) have greater power and authority to determine how land is to be used by foreign 
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investors and at what price, because, under the current land regime, municipalities and county 
governments are entrusted by the state to claim property rights over the land within their 
jurisdiction (Lin and Ho 2005). As a consequence, offering foreign investors low-cost (and 
sometimes no-cost) land, at least in the initial few years, has become a popular approach adopted 
by the cities and towns of Guangdong. Second, the growth of foreign investment, export 
industrialization, and GDP is commonly believed to be conditioned upon the improvement of the 
land-based urban built environment with an established infrastructure of telecommunications and 
transportation. This belief has been widely shared among local economic planners in their 
slogans of “building an attractive nest to lure a phoenix” (zhuchao yinfeng) and “building road 
networks to channel fortune” (lutong caitong). As such, the development of a land-based urban 
infrastructure has been taken as essential to the attraction of external capital, promotion of 
exports, and expansion of the local economy. Finally, land has been used as probably the only 
valuable, tangible, and fixed asset under the direct control of the municipal and county 
governments as collateral to obtain bank loans for initial urban growth, improvement of 
economic infrastructure, and further urban expansion. Unlike fluid forms of capital and labor, 
land is immobile and clearly demarcated within different territorial and jurisdictional boundaries. 
The competition among localities for foreign investment, industrialization, and GDP growth has 
been boiled down to a territorialized competition for land development. 
Since the mid-1990s, many municipalities in Guangdong have engaged in a new project 
of land-based urbanization to meet the challenges and competition raised by their rural 
counterparts as well as other cities of the same level elsewhere in the country. The response of 
large cities in Guangdong to the competition of their rural counterparts has taken various forms, 
among which three are directly relevant to land development. To make cities attractive to foreign 
investment, many municipal governments have set up economic and technological development 
zones (jingji jishu kaifaqu), which are larger in scale and boast better infrastructure than their 
rural counterparts. Because the inner city has suffered from congestion and pollution, most of the 
newly established development zones are located in the outskirts of the city, with easy 
accessibility to ports and other transport facilities. A prime example is the Huangpu Economic 
and Technological Development Zone, which was established in 1984 in the outskirts of 
Guangzhou. Although many of these development zones have given concessions in land leasing 
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and taxation to foreign investors, the subsequent inflow of capital investments and the 
agglomeration economies brought about as well as the upward effect on land prices in the city 
have been sufficient to make a long-term profit for the city.4 As such, the land development 
involved in the setting up of “development zones” has served the double purpose of mobilizing 
capital from foreign investors and property appreciation for local revenue generation. 
The second urban response to rural competition has been to substantially improve, 
upgrade, and expand the urban built environment so that the comparative advantages associated 
with the city and urbanization economies are further enhanced. The approach adopted was 
similar to the practice of “place-making” and “place-promotion” already well documented in the 
literature of urban entrepreneurialism in the West (Harvey 1989; Hubbard and Hall 1998; F. Wu 
2000; Lin 2007). The Chinese case is distinguished, however, by the direct involvement of 
municipal governments, not simply as planners but also as investors and developers. Since the 
1990s, large cities in Guangdong and particularly the Pearl River Delta region have engaged in 
upgrading and expanding their urban ring-road networks to break the bottleneck that had existed 
for decades because of Mao’s strategy of urban containment. Once the bottleneck was removed, 
new urban space was created to enable the development of a large number of urban 
entrepreneurial projects, such as new city centers, shopping malls, commercial housing, and all 
kinds of urban amenities. In the capital city of Guangzhou, a new urban developmental strategy 
was formulated in the 1990s, aimed at a substantial upgrade and expansion of the city’s built 
environment. The strategy has been implemented through the development of three ring-road 
networks; a metro railway system; a new city center; the sixty-three-story Tower of China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), which serves as the signature building 
of the new central business district; an international convention center; an Olympic sports 
stadium; an international airport, which has the largest capacity of freight and passenger 
transport in the region; and a new port in Nansha (Gaubatz 1999; Lin 2004; Xu and Yeh 2005). 
Improvement of the urban built environment has helped Guangzhou to reassert its leading 
position as a regional center of transnational capital and multinational corporations. Moreover, 
an upgraded urban built environment has had the immediate effect of boosting land property 
prices for the city and thereby contributing to the growth of the urban economy and generation of 
revenue for the municipal government. Although the improvement and upgrade of the urban built 
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environment required capital input, which usually takes the form of loans from state banks, the 
overall outcome of urban development has significantly benefited municipal governments in 
their attempt to enhance urban competitiveness, attract global capital, and generate local revenue. 
Finally, the urban housing sector, as one of the defining features of Chinese cities under 
socialism, has been subject to commodification and commercialization. The cities in Guangdong 
are among the first in the country to have commercialized the urban housing sector because of its 
special allowance to practice, its local established tradition in trading, and, most importantly, its 
geographic proximity to Hong Kong as the source of capital, information, and buyers. By 
commercializing housing provision, municipalities have managed to turn housing development 
from a burden of social welfare into a major source of revenue generation and, hence, original 
capital accumulation. This has been done in two important ways. Municipal governments could 
take land from the public sector of free administrative allocation (huabao) and lease it out 
through conveyance (churang) to the commercial sector for housing development. The price 
difference between free administrative allocation and paid conveyance has then contributed 
substantial profits for the municipal government to make. There is another way of making 
housing development even more lucrative. Municipal governments can use the exclusive 
authority given to them by the state to expropriate land from the rural vicinity at low cost and 
lease it out through conveyance to developers for commercial housing developments at a high 
price. The difference between the cost of land expropriation and the income from land 
conveyance can be another source of profits and revenue generation (Lin and Ho 2005).5 
Despite their difference in time and space, rural industrialization and urban development 
in Guangdong have both involved a conversion of land from the agricultural sector for industrial, 
transportation, housing, commercial, and other nonagricultural uses. While rural industrialization 
and urbanization involved a scattered and widespread conversion of agricultural land in the 
countryside, the location and expansion of urban development zones, ring-road networks, and 
commercial housing estates in the outskirts of large cities have pushed urban land to grow 
outward to encroach on agricultural land in their rural suburb on a large scale. When existing 
urban land has been used up, the municipal government will make administrative changes to 
expand its jurisdiction and incorporate suburban counties into the urban districts. The result is an 
intertwined process of city-driven land development and urban spatial expansion. 
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The Twin Process of Land Development and Urban Administrative Expansion 
The process of land development described in the foregoing section can be illustrated 
with data and information collected from Guangdong. Given the centrality of land in local 
revenue generation and its sensitivity to state monitoring, it is no easy task even for the central 
government to know exactly how much land every locality has and how much of it has actually 
been used for development purposes. It was not until the early 1990s that the central state 
became determined to undertake a nationwide land census to gather detailed information about 
China’s precious land resources. It took nearly eight years for the census to be completed for all 
localities in the country. The result was then adjusted to a standard date of 1996, in a manner 
similar to that of a population census (Lin and Ho 2003). A comparison of the data for 1996 and 
2004 reveals a pattern of land development characterized by industrialization and urbanization. 
In a time span of eight years, agricultural land shrank by 242,000 hectares (1.6 percent), whereas 
land used for industrial and urban development expanded by 220,000 hectares (19 percent). At 
the same time, land used for transportation increased by more than 31,000 hectares (40 percent).6 
Within agricultural land, the biggest drop was in cultivated land (6.7 percent). Although 
there was an increase in the land used for orchards and plantations (yuan di) as a result of the 
growth of market farming and the commercialization as well as diversification of the agricultural 
economy, the loss of cultivated land and forest exceeded the gain of orchards and other 
agricultural land by two-thirds. Obviously, much of the lost cultivated land had been used for 
nonagricultural purposes, such as industrial, urban, and transport developments. For the land 
used for industry and settlements, the biggest increase occurred in “stand-alone industrial and 
mining sites” (duli gongkuan) (58 percent), the growth of towns (52 percent), and the expansion 
of cities (21 percent). Clearly, much land has been taken away from cultivation to set up 
industrial and development zones, build highways and roads, and support the growth of cities 
and towns. Geographically, land development has been focused on the Pearl River Delta region. 
Of the reduction of agricultural land in Guangdong, more than half (58 percent) occurred in the 
Pearl River Delta region. In a similar manner, expansion in industrial and urban land in the delta 
region accounted for 77 percent of the provincial total. 
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Theoretically, the expansion of the land used for industrial and urban development can 
take two forms: the sprawl of existing cities and towns or the establishment of new cities and 
towns. It is interesting to note that, in the case of Guangdong, land-use development has been 
dominated overwhelmingly by the sprawl of existing cities and towns. Few, if any, new cities or 
towns have been set up in recent years. On the contrary, existing cities and towns have been 
either annexed by central cities or merged to form bigger ones. From 2000 to 2005, the total 
number of prefectural cities (diji shi) in Guangdong remained a constant twenty-one. However, 
three important changes occurred. First, the number of counties and county-level cities declined 
from 77 to 67; second, the number of urban districts comprising a city of large scale increased 
from 45 to 54; and third, the number of towns decreased from 1,556 to 1,145 (Guangdong 
Province Statistical Bureau 2001, 79; 2006, 47, 129). This pattern suggests that there were two 
simultaneous phenomena at work. First, existing counties and county-level cities were turned 
into urban districts, many of which were in large cities, and second, existing towns were turned 
into urban districts or merged to form bigger towns. In other words, existing cities and towns, 
particularly the larger ones, have expanded their urban space by incorporating those smaller ones 
in their vicinity. 
The recent expansion of urban space in some large cities and towns in Guangdong is 
closely interrelated with the pattern of land-use conversion identified earlier. The conversion of 
agricultural land for industrial and urban development has taken place primarily in the outskirts 
of large cities, where the demand for land has been high. Once the agricultural land within the 
municipal jurisdiction has run out, new land resources have to be found beyond the municipal 
boundary, and the boundary has to be broken through major administrative changes. This has 
been made possible by sometimes forceful annexation of both counties and county-level cities in 
the suburban areas of a central city and their transformation into urban districts under direct 
control of the central city. This approach has been adopted by central and large cities in the Pearl 
River Delta region. It started in the central city of Guangzhou, where a major administrative 
change was announced on May 21, 2000, to incorporate two of its suburban cities (Huadu to the 
north and Panyu to the south) into the urban districts. This practice was soon followed by many 
other cities in the region. On June 22, 2002, Jiangmen, a prefectural city, announced its 
annexation of Xinhui—a suburban city with a much bigger land area. An even more drastic and 
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controversial administrative change was made on December 8, 2002, when Foshan—also a 
prefectural city with a small urban built-up area—incorporated four suburban cities (Nanhai, 
Shunde, Sanshui, and Gaoming) and turned them into urban districts under its direct control.7 
This process of annexation of suburban economies by central cities explains the increase of 
urban districts and reduction of counties, county-level cities, and towns. 
The twin process of land development and urban administrative expansion has inevitably 
involved a territorial power struggle between a municipal government moving to claim and 
extend its power over the control of an expanded territory and the relocated suburban counties, 
towns, and villages hopelessly protecting their own territorial autonomy. Central to this political 
battling is the control over land as an asset and resource increasingly valuable to both sides. This 
territorial power struggle has involved a variety of practices, including zoning and “cluster” 
building, as well as new town developments (Cartier 2001; Ong 2006; Hsing 2006; Lin 2009a). 
In the case of Guangzhou, the forceful annexation of Huadu in the north and Panyu in the south 
into the urban district in May 2000 did not change the existing fiscal arrangement. Huadu and 
Panyu continued to function as separate administrative units with the same responsibilities and 
power in revenue collection. The annexation did not change the existing ownership of land, 
either. In other words, rural land in Huadu and Panyu continued to be owned by the rural 
collectives, and urban land in cities and towns continued to be owned by the state. Even the 
existing dichotomy of agricultural and nonagricultural populations in the household registration 
system remained intact, despite the change of Huadu and Panyu from a suburban county-level 
cities to urban districts. What really changed was the power to directly determine the planning 
and development of the land within the jurisdiction of Huadu and Panyu. Such power rested in 
Huadu and Panyu previously, but it was transferred to Guangzhou after the administrative 
annexation in May 2000. 
With the power to control and determine land development in the annexed territory, 
Guangzhou’s municipal government has been able to rearrange urban infrastructure in a much 
bigger space. The Baiyun International Airport, originally located within the urban district of 
Guangzhou, was moved out to Huadu in the north. Construction on the relocated and expanded 
Baiyun International Airport broke ground in August 2000, three months after administrative 
annexation took place, and was completed in August 2004 with an investment of RMB 19.8 
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billion. In a similar manner, the newly annexed Panyu district has been chosen as the site for the 
development of China’s first high-speed railway station, for the train connecting Guangzhou 
with Wuhan and eventually with Hong Kong in the future. The newly acquired territories of 
Huadu and Panyu have been turned into new sites to accommodate not just the airport and 
railway stations, but also many old and polluted industrial facilities, as well as warehouses 
relocated from the central city so that the land vacated in the downtown area could be 
transformed into more profitable commercial and real estate developments. 
On the other side of the battlefield, land has become the most important and, indeed, last 
countable asset for the county and township governments to effectively claim their territorial 
autonomy. The increased fluidity of capital and labor has meant that they can hardly be grasped 
in the hands of local governments. Only land with a demarcated administrative boundary can be 
taken as a resource from which revenue may be derived and political power may materialize. In a 
similar manner, and for obvious reasons, land has always been the basic resource for peasants to 
make their living. The forceful incorporation of rural counties and townships into the urban 
districts of central cities has therefore met with strong resentment from both rural governments 
and individual peasants. The immediate resentment and protests did not come from individual 
peasants, however. Many peasants simply have no knowledge about the long-term effects of a 
change in the administrative boundary of their land. To change the status of a rural county or 
town into an urban district of a large city may even create a (mis)perception among peasants that 
their residential status would be upgraded. Only the local cadres of rural governments are 
sophisticated enough to understand the negative effects of the administrative changes. The 
retitling from a mayor of a county-level city (shizhang) or county governor (xianzhang) into a 
district head (quzhang) is usually taken as a demotion, even though the official rank is kept at the 
same level. Such a “retitling” has meant, however, that local cadres of rural governments are 
now under the direct supervision of the municipal government and can no longer exercise any 
autonomy. The immediate resentment to urban administrative expansion into the rural hinterland 
have therefore come from the officials and cadres of the affected rural governments.8 In 
recognition of the contentious nature of urban administrative expansion, the municipal 
government has taken advantage of its power in personnel assignment to instantly remove 
leading officials of the annexed rural governments and have them reassigned to positions 
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elsewhere. In other words, territorial tension and contestation of power is reconciled through a 
territorial dismantling and relocation of power. 
 
Social and Political Origins 
The interrelated phenomena of land development and urban expansion identified above 
have to be understood in the broader context of a changing socialist political economy, 
particularly the reformulation of central-local fiscal relations that concerns investment and 
taxation. In the earlier era of state socialism and central planning, investment in capital 
construction (jiben jianshe touzi) was primarily a business handled by the central state through 
its budgetary allocation. Prior to the institutional reforms of the late 1970s, central budgetary 
allocation accounted for over 80 percent of China’s investment in capital construction (McGee et 
al. 2007, 17). Under that system, local governments had neither the authority nor the ability to 
mobilize capital for their own investment. That system allowed the central state to maintain tight 
control over capital investment to fulfill its developmental agenda. However, it was unable to 
respond adequately and efficiently to various local demands for regional development. To arouse 
local enthusiasm for economic development, the central state has, since the late 1970s, relaxed 
its control over local developmental affairs, decentralized the power of decision making, and 
shifted its responsibility of capital investment to the locality. Local governments are now 
allowed, and indeed encouraged, to explore their own ways of mobilizing capital for investment. 
Consequently, the share of the central budgetary allocation in capital construction declined 
substantially, from over 80 percent in 1976 to less than 10 percent in 1992 (McGee et al. 2007, 
17). For Guangdong, the contribution of state budgetary allocations to the investment in capital 
construction dropped from 65 percent in 1978 to less than 5 percent in 1992 (Lin 2009b, 272). 
With the gradual withdrawal of the central state as a provider of capital, local governments have 
to find all possible methods of capital mobilization and accumulation, including bank loans, 
foreign investments, and land development. 
The shift of investment responsibility from the central to local governments was initially 
compensated by a system of “fiscal contract” (caizheng baogan), in which local governments 
were allowed to retain their surplus revenue after a fixed lump-sum revenue had been remitted to 
the central state. The system provided great incentives to local governments for revenue 
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generation. Because the lump-sum remittance was fixed for a period of time, the surplus revenue 
retained by local governments has enjoyed dramatic expansion as the Chinese economy made its 
double-digit growth. In other words, the benefit of rapid economic growth has been enjoyed by 
local governments, and little has been given to the central state. The turning point was in 1994, 
when the central state in Beijing took action to confront Chinese provinces and introduce a 
“system of tax-sharing” (fenshuizhi) to replace the previous “system of fiscal contract.” The 
decision was made at the third plenum of the Fourteenth Party Central Committee in November 
1993, became a budgetary law (yusuanfa) at the second plenary session of the Eighth National 
People’s Congress in March 1994, and was implemented one month later (Chung 1994; Liu and 
Lin 1998; Tsang and Cheng 1994; Zhang 1999; Zhao and Zhang 1999).9 
The impact of implementing the new “system of tax-sharing” since 1994 on China’s 
national and regional development has been far reaching. It has become a watershed in the 
formulation of central-local fiscal relations in the postreform era. During the earlier years of the 
reforms in 1978–1994, local governments retained the bulk of the revenue generated under the 
arrangement of “fiscal contract” (caizheng baogang). In 1994, the central state managed to use 
its power and claim a share of the revenue roughly equal to that of local governments. Much of 
the revenue generated locally and retained locally to finance regional development has, since 
1994, been taken away by the central state. Under this new arrangement, local governments have 
had to look for new methods of revenue generation outside and beyond the taxable budgetary 
categories. It did not take long before local governments came to realize that the most viable 
alternative would be to expand their extrabudgetary revenue, in which “selling” land or, more 
precisely, land conveyance, was one of the most important sources of revenue generation.10 An 
analysis of the growth of local extrabudgetary revenue in both Guangdong and China between 
1978 and 2005 reveals a pattern characterized by rapid expansion after 1994. The ratios of 
income from land conveyance to local extrabudgetary revenue are equally important. For China 
as a whole, income from land conveyance made up over 26 percent of local extrabudgetary 
revenue during the period from 1995 to 2002 for which data are available. The ratio was over 30 
percent for Guangdong for the same period of time.11 These ratios represent only the average 
level of the province and the nation as a whole. For municipalities and townships in some rapidly 
growing economic regions, income from land conveyance must have contributed a percentage of 
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local extrabudgetary revenue significantly higher than the average figures reported here. Clearly, 
land development since the 1990s has become a main source of revenue generation and capital 
accumulation for local governments. The practices of land development and urban expansion 
that have characterized Guangdong since the 1990s have been driven by the motive of capital 
mobilization to finance the growth of the regional economy in a competitive world, and this 
motive has become an imperative after the reformulation of the central-local fiscal relation since 
1994. 
Conclusion 
Until recently, urbanization in both the developed and less developed worlds has been 
conventionally seen as a phenomenon in tandem with industrialization and economic growth. 
Emphasis has always been placed on the demographic dimension, without paying adequate 
attention to the role played by capital and land in the urbanization process. Important theoretical 
attempts were made in the 1980s to link the circuits of capital with the production of the urban 
built environment. However, the subsequent boom of the global economy in the 1990s 
effectively shifted so much scholarly attention to the powerful and pervasive operation of 
neoliberalism not only in the core, but in many nations and regions of the periphery as well. 
Meanwhile, studies of urbanization in China have been preoccupied by concerns over rural-to-
urban migration and land development under ambiguous property rights. The linkage between 
urbanization, land development, and local public finance remains poorly understood. 
This article examines the transformation of a rapidly urbanizing and globalizing regional 
economy in southern China, in which the territorialization of state power through land 
development has been actively pursued and has intensified place competition. An analysis of the 
practice in Guangdong Province has revealed a phenomenal process of land development, 
characterized by the conversion of land from the rural agricultural sector to industrial, urban, and 
commercial activities. Much of the newly developed land has been acquired through the 
expropriation and commodification of land that was owned collectively by the peasant 
population. The income generated from the expropriation and commodification of land has 
become a main source of local revenue and the key to financing regional development. The ever-
growing demand for new land as a source of capital accumulation has necessitated a 
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territorialization and urbanization practice through which central municipalities forcefully 
expand their jurisdictional boundaries into neighboring counties and exert direct control over 
their land. A contextual analysis of this process of local capital accumulation and land-centered 
politics has identified its underlying political and social forces, including the reformation of 
central-local political and fiscal relations, intensified place competition domestically and 
internationally, and penetration of the global forces of accumulation by dispossession. While the 
territorialization of state power through land development has enabled Guangdong to grow ahead 
of others in the country, it has contributed to increased regional inequality, social discontent, and 
environmental degradation. 
The territorialization of capital in contemporary China has manifested itself in two 
simultaneous dimensions: a region-based conversion of rural land into high-valued urban, 
industrial, and commercial developments across the country (a bottom-up urbanization) and a 
city-centered expansion of urban space into the rural vicinity (a top-down urbanization). Both 
dimensions are characterized by fierce competition for the power to control the increasingly 
valuable, yet dwindling, land resources. In both cases, territory is not simply a container, and 
territorialization is not a passive outcome of economic growth. Instead, territorialization has 
become a state project actively pursued by municipal and local governments to claim, 
consolidate, and strengthen power. Territorialization has functioned as one of the essential 
elements that constitute the complex “China story,” with multiple implications for not only the 
evolving trajectories of economic growth but also uneven spatial development and societal 
transformation. 
 
George C. S. Lin is professor and associate dean of Geography at The University of Hong Kong.  
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1 The work described in this paper has been sponsored by grants obtained from the Research 
Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (GRF HKU-747509H), 
the Fellowship Program of Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development 
and Land Policy, and the Contemporary China Strategic Research Theme of the University of 
Hong Kong. The author wishes to thank Wen-hsin Yeh, Laurence J. C. Ma, You-tien Hsing, 
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Jenn-hwan Wang, Joyce Man, and two anonymous reviewers for their critical comments, which 
have helped improve the quality of the paper significantly. 
2 For instance, the GDP generated by Guangzhou city (shiqu) contributed over 34 percent of the 
regional total generated in the Pearl River Delta in 1992. Significantly, this share dropped to only 
23 percent in 1995, as other county-level economies in the hinterland dramatically expanded 
their shares. For detailed documentation, see Lin (2004, 34). 
3 For a detailed discussion of China's changing taxation system, see World Bank (2002) and 
Wong and Bird (2008). 
4 The concessions offered to foreign investors usually included a total tax exemption in the first 
three years of entrance to the zone and a 50 percent tax exemption for the following two years. 
The management committee of the zone (i.e., Kaifaqu Guanweifei) was given special authority 
by the central government to approve the establishment of foreign ventures in the zone up to a 
certain limit (e.g., US$30 million per project) beyond which central approval would need to be 
sought. The inclusion of real estate and commercial activities into development zones has been 
an interesting and arguably more profitable practice widely adopted. The establishment of a 
development zone usually starts with the leveling of land and the set-up of infrastructure (a road 
network, electricity, sewage discharge system, etc.), which requires capital investment. One 
popular approach is to form a partnership or joint venture with foreign developers who can 
provide the needed capital. The other approach is to use land as collateral and obtain bank loans 
from domestic or foreign sources. Once the infrastructure has been set up, the land within the 
zone will have a higher value than before and will generate profits when it is “sold” (i.e., 
conveyed) or leased out to commercial users. For detailed discussion, see Li (1998), Cartier 
(2001), and Lin (2009). 
5 A land conveyance fee is essentially a top-up price over the land after covering the cost of land 
expropriation (and infrastructure preparation, if any). For a detailed discussion of the difference 
in prices between land expropriation and land conveyance, see Lin and Ho (2005). 
6 The data used in this and the following paragraphs are from Guangdong Province (2005). 
7 It is interesting to note that Nanhai, Shunde, and Sanshui have been some of the most rapidly 
expanding county-level economies that occupied leading positions not just in Guangdong but in 
the nation. In contrast, Foshan had a much smaller economy and land area. This administrative 
change was so controversial that it involved the direct intervention of both the provincial and 
central authorities.  
8 One of the incidents reported in the news media was a riot mobilized by the local government 
of Daye, a county-level city located in the suburban area of Wuhan, Hubei Province. On August 
6, 2005, the local government of Daye organized over ten thousand residents to protest against 
the annexation of Daye into the urban district of Huangshi municipality. The riot was 
subsequently cracked down. Top officials of the Daye government, including its deputy party 
secretary, deputy chairman of the People Congress, chairman of the Political Consultative 
Committee, and director of the Bureau of Civil Affairs, were sacked and stripped of their party 
memberships (Editor 2006). 
9 Guangdong was among the first allowed to practice the “system of fiscal responsibility” 
(caizheng baoganzhi) in 1980. Under this arrangement, a fixed sum of revenue was negotiated 
and agreed on between the central and provincial governments for remittance to the central 
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government. This lump-sum remittance was fixed in amount for five years. Since the remittance 
was fixed not by ratio but by amount, the locality was greatly encouraged to raise more revenue, 
because any surplus generated could be retained within the province. As the economy expanded 
later, this arrangement became a disadvantage to the central government because the share of the 
surplus increased but the amount of remittance remained fixed. It was subsequently changed and 
replaced in 1994 by a “system of tax-sharing” (fenshuizhi) in which localities were mandated by 
law to transfer to the central government taxes proportional to local income. For detailed 
discussions, see Chung (1994); Liu and Lin (1998); Tsang and Cheng (1994); Zhang (1999); 
Zhao and Zhang (1999). 
10 Extra-budgetary revenue includes five main categories: first, fees collected by administrative 
and institutional units; second, self-raised funds by township governments; third, income from 
government funds; fourth, income from state-owned enterprises and their administrative 
departments; and, fifth, other revenues. An analysis of comparable data during the period from 
1998 to 2004 revealed that the largest source of income, nearly 70 percent of the revenue, lay in 
the fees collected by administrative and institutional units to which income from land 
development belongs. 
11 It is generally known to the central government and Chinese researchers that the bulk of local 
extrabudgetary revenue has been contributed by income from land development. Unfortunately, 
the exact magnitude remains unknown. For obvious reasons, local governments have every 
incentive to conceal the income made from land sales. It was estimated that China collected a 
land conveyance fee of 910 billion yuan between 2001 and 2003, was the equivalent of 35 
percent of China’s local budgetary revenue. Land conveyance fees collected in 2004 totaled 589 
billion yuan, or 47 percent of local budgetary revenue. See Editorial (2006, 1). Another estimate 
widely circulated among Chinese researchers and in the news media has been that land 
conveyance fees accounted for at least 60 percent of the local government’s extrabudgetary 
revenue. See Fu (2006) and Wang (2006). Ping Xinjiao, an economist from Peking University, 
estimated that China’s local revenue generated from land sales and land leasing in 2004 was 615 
billion yuan, 30 percent higher than China’s total extrabudgetary revenue (470 billion yuan). See 
Ping (2006, 15). Li Xun’s study of the case of Guangzhou suggests that land-related income 
accounted for 23 to 36 percent of the integrated revenue (both budgetary and extrabudgetary) of 
Guangzhou municipality between 1992 and 1999. See Li (2005, 32). 
 
References 
Apple Daily. 2006. “Deputy party secretary of Daye, Hubei, sacked for mobilizing protests.” 
February 26:A23. 
Armstrong, W., and T. G. McGee. 1985. Theatres of Accumulation: Studies in Asian and Latin 
American Urbanization. London: Methuen. 
Ash, R. F. 1988. “The Evolution of Agricultural Policy.” The China Quarterly 116:529–555. 
Ash, R. F., and R. L. Edmonds. 1998. “China’s Land Resources, Environment and Agricultural 
Production.” The China Quarterly 156:836–879. 
Brown, G. P. 1995. “Arable Land Loss in Rural China.” Asian Survey 35 (10): 922–940. 
Lin 23 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu).   
E-Journal No. 1 (December 2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Brown, L. 1995. Who Will Feed China?: Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet. New York: Norton. 
Cai, Y. 2003. “Collective Ownership or Cadres’ Ownership?: The Non-Agricultural Use of 
Farmland in China.” The China Quarterly 175:662–680. 
Cartier, C. 2001. “‘Zone Fever,’ the Arable Land, and Real Estate Speculation: China’s Evolving 
Land Use Regime and Its Geographical Contradictions.” Journal of Contemporary China 
10 (28): 445–469. 
Chan, K. W. 1992. “Economic Growth Strategy and Urbanization Policies in China, 1949–
1982.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 16 (2): 275–305. 
———. 1994. “Urbanization and Rural-Urban Migration in China since 1982: A New Baseline.” 
Modern China 20 (3): 243–281. 
———. 2007. “Misconceptions and Complexities in the Study of China’s Cities: Definitions, 
Statistics, and Implications.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 48 (4): 382–412. 
Chan, K. W., and Y. Hu. 2003. “Urbanization in China in the 1990s: New Definition, Different 
Series, and Revised Trends.” The China Review 3 (2): 49–71. 
China Ministry of Finance. 1993–2007. Finance Yearbook of China. Beijing: China Finance 
Magazine Press. 
China Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (CMHURD). 1990–2007. Zhongguo 
chengshi jianshe tongji nianbao [China urban construction statistics yearbook]. Beijing: 
China Architecture & Building Press. 
China Ministry of Land and Resources (CMLR). 1999–2007. Zhongguo guotu ziyuan nianjian 
[Almanac of China’s land and resources]. Beijing: China Land Press. 
China State Statistical Bureau (CSSB). 1985–2009b. Zhongguo chengshi tongji nianjian [China 
urban statistical yearbook]. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
———. 1990–2009a. Zhongguo tongji nianjian [China statistical yearbook]. Beijing: China 
Statistics Press. 
Chung, J. H. 1994. “Beijing Confronting the Province: The 1994 Tax-Sharing Reform and Its 
Implications for Central-Provincial Relations in China.” China Information 9 (2/3): 1–23. 
———. 1995. “Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People’s Republic of China.” The 
China Quarterly 142:487–508. 
Deng, F. F., and Y. Huang. 2004. “Uneven Land Reform and Urban Sprawl in China: The Case 
of Beijing.” Progress in Planning 61 (3): 211–236. 
Editorial, 2006. “Tudi churangjin gaige de hongguan jinji xiaoying” [The macro economic 
effects of reforms of land conveyance fee]. 21st Siji jinji baodao [Twenty-First Century 
Economic News]. September 4, 1. 
Fan, C. C. 1995. “Of Belts and Ladders: State Policy and Uneven Regional Development in 
Post-Mao China.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 85 (3): 421–449. 
———. 2008. China on the Move: Migration, the State, and the Household. London and New 
York: Routledge.http://usj.sagepub.com/cgi/external_ref?access_num=10.1111/j.1467-
8306.1995.tb01807.x&link_type=DOI 
Fu, Y. 2006. “Tudi churangjin xinzheng de zhengfu zhili yunhan” [Implications for the control 
of governments under the new situation of governance based on land conveyance fees]. 
Zhongguo jinji ribao [China Economic Daily]. July 18. 
Lin 24 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu).   
E-Journal No. 1 (December 2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Gaubatz, P. 1999. “China’s Urban Transformation: Patterns and Processes of Morphological 
Change in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.” Urban Studies 36 (9): 1495–1521. 
Glassman, J. 2006. “Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by 
‘Extra-Economic’ Means.” Progress in Human Geography 30:608–625. 
Guangdong Province. 2005. “Guangdongsheng tudi biangeng diaocha nianmo mianjibiao 1996–
2004” [Tabulation of the surveyed year-end area of land use change in Guangdong 
Province, 1996–2004]. Unpublished data in digital form found in Guangzhou, China. 
Guangdong Province Population Census Office. 1992. Guangdongsheng 1990 nian renkou 
pucha ziliao [Guangdong province 1990 population census data]. Beijing: China 
Statistics Press. 
Guangdong Province Statistical Bureau. 2001–2010. Guangdong Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: 
China Statistics Press. 
Haila, A. 2007. “The market as the new emperor.” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 31 (1): 3–20. 
Harvey, D. 1985. The Urbanization of Capital. Oxford: Blackwell. 
———. 1989. “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban 
Governance in Late Capitalism.” Geografiska Annaler 71B (1): 3–17. 
———. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heilig, G. K. 1997. “Anthropogenic Factors in Land Use Change in China.” Population and 
Development Review 23 (1): 139–168. 
Ho, P. 2001. “Who Owns China’s Land?: Policies, Property Rights, and Deliberate Institutional 
Ambiguity.” The China Quarterly 166:394–421. 
———. 2005. “Introduction: the chicken of institutions or the egg of reforms.” In 
Developmental dilemmas: land reform and institutional change in China, edited by Peter 
Ho, 1-32. London: Routledge. 
Ho, S. P. S., and G. C. S. Lin. 2003. “Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: 
Policies and Practices.” The China Quarterly 175:681–707. 
———. 2004a. “Converting Land to Nonagricultural Use in China’s Coastal Provinces: 
Evidence from Jiangsu.” Modern China 30 (1): 81–112. 
———. 2004b. “Non-Agricultural Land Use in Post-Reform China.” The China Quarterly 
179:758–781. 
Hsing, Y. T. 2006. “Land and Territorial Politics in Urban China.” The China Quarterly 187:1–
18. 
———. 2010. The Great Urban Transformation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Huang, Y. 2008. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hubbard, P., and T. Hall, eds. 1998. The Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics, Regime 
and Representation. Chichester, NY: John Wiley. 
Johnson, E., and G. D. Peterson. 1999. Historical Dictionary of Guangzhou (Canton) and 
Guangdong. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow. 
Kung, J., and S. Liu. 1997. “Farmer’s Preferences Regarding Ownership and Land Tenure in 
Post-Mao China: Unexpected Evidence from Eight Counties.” The China Journal 38:33–
64. 
Lin 25 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu).   
E-Journal No. 1 (December 2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Li, H. 1998. “Woguo kaifaqu buju ji tudi liyong xianzhuang fenxi yu yanjiu” [A study of the 
location and land use pattern of development zones in our country]. Zhongguo tudi kexue 
[China Land Science] 12 (3): 9–12. 
Li, X. 2005. “Guangzhoushi zhengfu tudi shouyi yanjiu” [A study of the land development 
revenue for Guangzhou municipality]. Consultancy Report. Unpublished document found 
in Guangzhou, China. 
Lichtenberg, E., and C. R. Ding. 2008. “Assessing Farmland Protection Policy in China.” Land 
Use Policy 25 (1): 59–68. 
———. 2009. “Local Officials as Land Developers: Urban Spatial Expansion in China.” Journal 
of Urban Economics 66 (1): 57–64. 
Lin, G.C.S. 1997. Red Capitalism in South China: Growth and Development of the Pearl River 
Delta. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
———. 1999. “State Policy and Spatial Restructuring in Post-Reform China, 1978–95.” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23 (4): 670–696. 
———. 2001. “Metropolitan Development in a Transitional Socialist Economy: Spatial 
Restructuring in the Pearl River Delta, China.” Urban Studies 38 (3): 383–406. 
———. 2002. “The Growth and Structural Change of Chinese Cities: A Contextual and 
Geographical Analysis. Cities 19 (5): 299–316. 
———. 2004. “Toward a Post-Socialist City? Economic Tertiarization and Urban Reformation 
in the Guangzhou Metropolis, China.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 45 (1): 18–
44. 
———. 2007. “Reproducing Spaces of Chinese Urbanization: New City-Based and Land-
Centered Urban Transformation. Urban Studies 44 (9): 1827–1855. 
———. 2009a. Developing China: Land, Politics, and Social Conditions. London: Routledge. 
———. 2009b. “Scaling-Up Regional Development in Globalizing China: Local Capital 
Accumulation, Land-Centered Politics, and Reproduction of Space. Regional Studies 43 
(3): 429–447. 
Lin, G. C. S., and S. P. S. Ho. 2003. “China’s Land Resources and Land-Use Change: Insights 
from the 1996 Land Survey. Land Use Policy 20 (3): 87–107. 
———. 2005. “The State, Land System, and Land Development Processes in Contemporary 
China.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95 (2): 411–436. 
Lin, G. C. S., and F. Yi. 2011. “Urbanization of Capital or Capitalization on Urban Land? Land 
Development and Local Public Finance in Urbanizing China.” Urban Geography 32 (1): 
50–79. 
Liu, Y., and G. C. S. Lin. 1998. “Changing Central-Local Relation in Post-Reform China: A 
Geographical Perspective.” The Journal of Chinese Geography 8 (3): 203–220. 
Lo, C. P. 1990. “The Geography of Rural Regional Inequality in Mainland China.” Transactions 
of the Institute of British Geographers 15:466–486. 
Ma, L. J. C. 2002. “Urban Transformation in China, 1949–2000: A Review and Research 
Agenda.” Environment and Planning A 34 (9): 1545–1569. 
———. 2005. “Urban Administrative Restructuring, Changing Scale Relations and Local 
Economic Development in China.” Political Geography 24 (4): 477–497. 
Lin 26 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu).   
E-Journal No. 1 (December 2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ma, L. J. C., and G. H. Cui. 2002. “Economic Transition at the Local Level: Diverse Forms of 
Town Development in China.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 43 (2): 79–103. 
Ma, L. J. C., and M. Fan. 1994. “Urbanization from Below: The Growth of Towns in Jiangsu, 
China.” Urban Studies 31 (10): 1625–1645. 
Ma, L. J. C., and G. C. S. Lin. 1993. “Development of Towns in China: A Case Study of 
Guangdong Province.” Population and Development Review 19 (3): 583–606. 
Ma, L. J. C., and F. Wu. 2005. “Restructuring the Chinese City: Diverse Processes and 
Reconstituted Spaces.” In Restructuring the Chinese City, edited by L. J. C. Ma and F. 
Wu, 1–20. London: Routledge. 
McGee, T. G. 1991. “The Emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia: Expanding a Hypothesis.” In 
The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia, edited by Norton Gingsburg, 
Bruce Koppel, and Terry G. McGee, 3–25. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
McGee, T. G., G. C. S. Lin, A. M. Marton, M. Y. L. Wang, and J. Wu. 2007. China’s Urban 
Space: Development under Market Socialism. London: Routledge. 
Naughton, B. 1995. “Cities in the Chinese Economic System: Changing Roles and Conditions 
for Autonomy.” In Urban Spaces in Contemporary China, edited by Deborah S. Davis, 
Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton, and Elizabeth J. Perry, 61–89. Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 
OECD 2007. “Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign Direct Investment.”  Accessed April 
5, 2008. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/43/38818788.pdf. 
Ong, A. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press. 
Pannell, C. W. 2002. “China’s Continuing Urban Transition.” Environment and Planning A 34 
(9): 1571–1589. 
Peterson, G. E., and P. C. Annez. 2007. Financing Cities: Fiscal Responsibility and Urban 
Infrastructure in Brazil, China, India, Poland, and South Africa. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 
Ping, X. 2006. “Zhongguo difang yusuan tizhi de jixiao pinggu ji zhibiao sheji” [An assessment 
of the effect of China’s local extra-budgetary system and its design of indicators]. 
Working Paper Series No. C2006018, China Center for Economic Research, Peking 
University, Beijing. 
Po, L. C. 2008. “Redefining Rural Collectives in China: Land Conversion and the Emergence of 
Rural Shareholding Co-Operatives.” Urban Studies 45 (8): 1603–1623. 
Smil, V. 1995. Who Will Feed China? The China Quarterly 143:801–813. 
———. 1999. “China’s Agricultural Land.” The China Quarterly 158:414–429. 
Tsang, S., and Y. Cheng. 1994. “China’s Tax Reforms of 1994.” Asian Survey 34:770–788. 
Tsui, K., and Y. Wang. 2004. “Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal 
Decentralization in China.” The China Quarterly 177:71–90. 
Unirule Institute of Economics. 2007. Chengshihua beijingxia tudi chanquan de shishi he baohu 
[Operation and protection of land property rights in China’s urbanization]. Beijing: 
Unirule Institute of Economics. 
Veeck, G. 1995. “Introduction.” Chinese Environment and Development 6 (1/2): 5–8. 
Lin 27 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu).   
E-Journal No. 1 (December 2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Vogel, E. F. 1989. One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under Reform. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Walker, R., and D. Buck. 2007. “The Chinese Road: Cities in the Transition to Capitalism.” New 
Left Review 46:39–66. 
Wang, G. H. and X. J. Huang. 2008. “Environmental Impact Assessment of General Land Use 
Planning Implementation from 1997 to 2010.” In Jiangsu Province, China Population, 
Resources and Environment [in Chinese]. 18 (2): 176–180. 
Wang, W. 2006. “60% yishang-tudi churangjin jinshouru zhang zhengfu yishuanwai shouru de 
baifengbi” [Over 60 percent-net income of land conveyance fee accounted for the extra-
budgetary revenue of local governments]. Zhongguo fandichang bao [China Real Estate 
Daily], August 6. 
Wang, Y. M., and S. Scott. 2008. “Illegal Farmland Conversion in China’s Urban Periphery: 
Local Regime and National Transitions.” Urban Geography 29 (4): 327–347. 
Wei, Y. D. 2000. Regional Development in China: States, Globalization, and Inequality. London: 
Routledge. 
Wong, C. P. W. 1991. “Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of 
Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China.” The China Quarterly 128:691–714. 
———. 1997. Financing Local Government in the People’s Republic of China. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
———. 2000. “Central-Local Relations Revisited: The 1994 Tax Sharing Reform and Public 
Expenditure Management in China. China Perspectives 31:52–63. 
Wong, C. P. W., and R. M. Bird. 2008. “China’s Fiscal System: A Work in Progress.” In China’s 
Great Economic Transformation, edited by Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, 429–
466. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wong, C. P. W., C. Heady, and W. T. Woo. 1995. Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in 
the People’s Republic of China. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank. 2002. China: National Development and Sub-National Finance: A Review of 
Provincial Expenditure. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Wu, F. 1996. “Changes in the Structure of Public Housing Provision in Urban China.” Urban 
Studies 33:1601–1627. 
———. 2000. “The Global and Local Dimensions of Place-Making: The Remaking of Shanghai 
as a World City. Urban Studies 37:1359–77. 
———. 2008. “China’s Great Transformation: Neoliberalization as Establishing a Market 
Society. Geoforum 39:1093–1096. 
Wu, F., J. Xu, and A. G. O. Yeh. 2007. Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, 
Market, and Space. London: Routledge. 
Wu, W. 1999. “Reforming China’s Institutional Environment for Urban Infrastructure 
Provision.” Urban Studies 36 (13): 2263–2282. 
———2010. “Urban Infrastructure Financing and Economic Performance in China. Urban 
Geography 31 (5): 648–667. 
Xu, J., and A. G. O. Yeh. 2005. “City Repositioning and Competitiveness Building in Regional 
Development: New Development Strategies in Guangzhou, China.” International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research 29 (2): 283–308. 
Lin 28 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu).   
E-Journal No. 1 (December 2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
———. 2009. “Decoding Urban Land Governance: State Reconstruction in Contemporary 
Chinese Cities. Urban Studies 46 (3): 559–581. 
Xu, X., and S. Li. 1990. “China’s Open Door Policy and Urbanization in the Pearl River Delta 
Region.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 14 (1): 46–69. 
Yang, D., and H. Wang. 2008. “Dilemmas of Local Governance under the Development Zone 
Fever in China: A Case Study of the Suzhou Region.” Urban Studies 45 (5/6): 1037–
1054. 
Ye, A. G. O. and F. Wu. 1996. “The New Land Development Process and Urban Development 
in Chinese Cities. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 20 (2): 330–
353. 
Zhang, J. X., and F. Wu. 2006. “China’s Changing Economic Governance: Adminstrative 
Annexation and the Reorganization of Local Governments in the Yangtze River Delta.” 
Regional Studies 40 (1): 3–21. 
Zhang, L.Y. 1999. “Chinese Central-Provincial Fiscal Relationships, Budgetary Decline and the 
Impact of the 1994 Fiscal Reform: An Evaluation.” The China Quarterly 157:115–141. 
Zhao, X. B., and L. Zhang. 1999. “Decentralization Reforms and Regionalism in China: A 
Review.” International Regional Science Review 22 (3): 251–281. 
Zhou, Y., and L. J. C. Ma. 2003. “China’s Urbanization Levels: Reconstructing a Baseline from 
the Fifth Population Census.” The China Quarterly 173:176–196. 
Zhu, J. M. 2002. “Urban Development under Ambiguous Property Rights: A Case of China’s 
Transition Economy.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26 (1): 41–
57. 
———. 2004. “From Land Use Right to Land Development Right: Institutional Change in 
China’s Urban Development.” Urban Studies 41 (7): 1249–1267. 
———. 2005. “A Transitional Institution for the Emerging Land Market in Urban China.” 
Urban Studies 42 (8): 1369–1390. 
Zhu, K., R. Prosterman, J. Ye, P. Li, J. Riedinger, and Y. Ouyang. 2006. “The Rural Land 
Question in China: Analysis and Recommendations Based on a Seventeen-Province 
Survey.” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 38:761–839. 
Zhu, Keliang and R. Prosterman. 2007. “Securing Land Rights for Chinese Farmers: A Leap 
Forward for Stability and Growth.” In Cato Development Policy Analysis Series, No. 3. 
Washington, DC: The Cato Institute. 
